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TRUTH MACHINES AND CONSEQUENCES:
THE LIGHT AND DARK SIDES OF
'ACCURACY' IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SE1'H F KRELMER"/:

INTRODUCTIO : THE TRUTH MACHINE:
Dl A TESTI GAD ACTUAL I NOCENCE
I first encountered the issues surrounding DNA analysis in the
criminal justice system a little more than three years ago, when my
colleague David Rudovsky approached me with the case of Bruce
Godschalk, which he had been asked to handle with the Innocence
Project. ]
Bruce Godschalk, who had been convicted of two rapes in
1987, and who still denied committing the offenses, had heard of
the possibilities of DNA testing. He had, through counsel, approached the office of the district attorney who had handled his
case, seeking access to biological samples in both rapes. Mr. Godschalk argued that if the DNAc sequence in the samples was not his,
it 'would prove that he was innocent of the crimes for 'which he had
been convicted. The district attorney refused to provide access to
the samples, relying on what he regarded as the importance of "finality" in criminal justice. Mr. Godschalk had been identified by
both victims, and was reported to have confessed details of the
crimes to two detectives that could have been known only to the
rapist. He had been convicted after full trial, and was, in the eyes of
the law, guilty. Allowing him to continue to challenge his convic--------------_._--,-----------------

':' Kenneth W. Gemmill Professo, of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law
School. This paper \Vas delivered at the POI,vers and Pitfalls of Technology
S)'mposium, held February 6, 20(H, at New York University School of Ln\!. It has
benefited from the perceptive comments of Paul Robinson, David Ruclovsky, and
Chris Sanchirico, as well as the fine research assistance of Indraneel Sur and Mihir
Kshirsagar. Each deserves m~' deep gratitude, but none bears any responsibility f()r
mistakes that the paper retains.
1, The Innocence Project, established in 1992, is a pathbreakil1g clmic that
k,nclles cases in which "postcol1vicrion D A testing of e\'iclence can yield conclusive proof of innocence. ,. About this Innocenre Project. fit hup://www.inIJocencepf(~jecLorg/about/i)ldex.php(last visited Oct. 2B, 2()(H). To date the
Innocence Project',,; wehsitt: lists 15'2 D]'\;\ exonerations. http://www.innocence
projecl.org/case/displa\_f",;e~php(last '.'i';ited Oct. 28. 200oJ).
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tion, the argument went, ,vas a dissenrice to the victims and to the
criminal justice system.
Ultimately, we were forced to bring a Section 1983 action in
federal court to compel access to the samples. vVith the aid of some
creative legal analysis and a sympathetic trial judge, the samples
were tested. They proved that the same man had in fact committed
both rapes, and that man was not Bruce Godschalk.~
Our argument in the Godschalk case relied on both constitutional claims grounded in the right of meaningful access to courts:~
and an extension of the doctrine of Brady v. iVlmyland,-+ which obligates prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence before trial. It
rested crucially on the proposition that D A testing can serve as
what both Peter Neufeld of the Innocence Project and Attorney
General John Ashcroft have characterized as a kind of "truth machine.":; vVhatever the limits of affirmative constitutional obligations imposed on courts and prosecutors to initiate review of
convictions when newly discovered evidence emerges, we argued,
the probative power of DNA evidence was such that a prosecutor
could not legitimately stand in the way of a private effort to obtain
evidence that could establish beyond doubt that a prior conviction
2. Godschalk v. !'vlontgomery County Dist. Attornev's Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d
36b (£.D. Pa. 20() 1). [h;-l\'e previously described the case and cxplored the issues
surrounding postcom'iction DNA testing in Seth F. Kreimer & David RUclovsky,
DOI/!)!t Helix, f)o/l/;/e Bind: F([ctual [mwu'l7((' 'Itld Poslroll'{lirtion [),\'A Testing, 151 U.
P.\. L. Ih\· . .')47 (2002).
3. Fp,., BE&K Cnnstr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. :')16, 524-2S (2002) (recognizing

constitutional import.ance of the right to seek redress of gricvances); Christophcl
v. Harbul'y, 536 Li.s. [(n, 412-1 :~, 415 n.12 (2002) (detailing constitutional roots of
right of access): Bounds \'. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977) Cft is now established
beyond doubt that prisoners hal'e a constitutional right 0[" access to the courts.");
Procunier Y. i\IarLinez, 4J(j L!,S. 396, 419 (l974) ("Regulations and practices that
ulljustil"lably obstruct the a\~lilability of professional representation or other aspects olthe right oj' access to the couns are invalid."); .Johnson \'. Avery, 39:1 L.S.
483,490 (1969) (inY,t1idating rule of prison administration that forbade prisoners
from assisting other prisoners in preparing petitions for postconviction relief),
4. :n3 U.S. i'n

(19():~).

S. /\d7 (Jlirillg '/llslir(' TllIlJllgh FOIFllsir [)i\'/\ ,!prl/llo!og)': Hearillg Bej'rili' Ihe SubUJIt/II/. Oil Cri III P, Tnmrislll. ([/Id Home!([nd Serllrily, HOUSf.!lldicirllY CO/llill., 108r.h Congo
I

(:ZO(n) (statement of Peter J Ncufeld, Co-Director, Tnnocence Project)
(" [Flolensic DNA opcrates as a truth machine with the power to c()]wiet tbe guilt\
and protect the innocent. in a wav that will imprm'e dramatically the efficacy of the
criminal .justice svsrem."): .-\ttorney General Joh:1 Ashcroft, ~ews Conference on
DNA Initiative ("DNA tcchno!cl!-,')' bas proven itself to be the truth machine of law
enforcemcnt, cns:lring justice by identifYing the guilty and exonerating the innoceq t"). al h up:/ /w\V\\'. usdoj .gov/ag/speeches/2002/030402ncwscolifcrnccdnainitidtivc.htm (i'vIar. 4, 20(2),
3:~
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did not rest on a foundation of "factual guilt." It would stretch legal
fiction beyond the breaking point to characterize a prisoner as scientifically innocent, but guilty in the eyes of the law. Nor can the
state, consistent with the demands of the Constitution, continue to
imprison an individual once his innocence has been so demonstrated. To the credit of our system of justice, the federal trial
judge agreed, and once the testing had demonstrated Mr. Godschalk's innocence, the state courts freed him.
The story of Bruce Godschalk has replicated itself often
enough around the country to raise questions about both the reliability of the criminal justice system and the priorities of some of our
prosecutors. But in some way~, the story is one of a temporary transition. If NIr. Godschalk had been arrested after the mid-1990s, one
of the first things police and prosecutors would have done is to seek
to compare his DNA profile with that of the biological evidence left
by the rapists. And if, as is the case with about a quarter of the
prime suspects in sexual assault cases whose DNA is tested by the
FBI laboratories every year,() the results exonerated him, he would
have been released.
Many district attorneys have undertaken efforts to evaluate evidence that might tend to exonerate currently incarcerated prisoners of their mvn accord,7 and many states have adopted statutory
schen1es that provide access to postconviction DNA testing.:-'. Innocence Projects around the country have continued to seek access to
potentially exonerating DNA testing and pending federal legislation is likely to improve the situation still further.~) The combination of these initiatives means that the stock of prisoners who can
be freed by first-generation DNA testing of biological evidence is
probably dwindling.
6. Eg., Peter l\cufeld & BatTy C. Scheck, Comnwnta))', ill
_.\1.., CON\'ICITD BY JURIES,

EDW.-\RD

E"-O".:FR.\TFD BY SCIENCE: C.'\SI·~ Sflll)IFS L

CO:'-i:'-!ORS n
['[-IF USE OF

D0-iA E\'IDF:'-i(E TO ESTABl.ISH h:---;oCr"iCE AF'TFR TRIAL, at xxviii, xxviii (Nat'l InSL oj
Justice R<.:search R<.:port No. NCJ 161 ~:);j, 1996) (noting that DNA c\idence h,I'
been routinely used in the il1vcstigatin~ process of criminal cases, and has resultec
in the clearance of prime suspects ill twenty-five percent of sexu,1! <lssault casc~
referred to the FBI since 1~8~ in which D;\IA results could be ohtained), (IVai/aU
at http://www.nc:jrs.org/pclfldnaevid.pclf.
7. Sfe Kreimer & Ruclovsky, S'll/1m note 2, at 557-60.
8. Eg" DEP'T OF' .luSTIG, A.n\.-\:--:C1NC JUSTICE THROLCII DNA TECII;'-;OIOCY I·
C-ZOO:,), a;ailabLe at http://w.\v\v.usdoj.gov/ag/clnapolicybookJov.htm.
9. AdvancingJusticc Through D~A Technology Act of 2003, H.R. 3214, 108tl
Congo §~ 311-312 (2003) (pro\'iding procedures for federal postconvicrion DN,
testing and authorizing grants of five million dollars annually to help slates defra
the costs of postconviction DNA testing).
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As with any technological advance, however, the first generation of effects is not likely to be the last. In this essay, I will brieDy
review some legal issues that are likely to arise from the next generation of advances. Section I of this essay addresses challenges
rooted in the promise of ever more accurate "truth machines" to
identifY unjust convictions. Civil libertarians like me will use these
increases in potential accuracy to press the cases of alleged offenders who claim to have been wrongfully convicted. The window into
the past provided by evolving technology will make it ever more
difficult for a system that values justice to tolerate imprisonment of
the innocent.
At the same time, the promise of epistemological certainty provided by DNA testing has a dark side for civil libertarians. Section II
of the essay focuses on two troubling potential consequences. First,
increased payoffs to DNA evidence generate increased pressure to
collect that evidence from willing and unwilling subjects alike, pressure that is unlikely to be resisted effectively by current Fourth
Amendment doctrine. Second, the ability to revisit the accuracy of
criminal verdicts will put stress on traditional protections against
double jeopardy. The former effect, I argue, is not without its redeeming virtues, for it will build a stronger hedge against miscarriages of justice. The latter, however, bears the seeds of real
dangers, and I adumbrate a series of arguments that civil libertarians will need to advance to hold those dangers in check.
1.
FREEING THE IN aCENT IN THE
TvVENTY-FIRST CE TTURY
During the next decade we arc likely to see at least a second
wave of cases like that of Me Godschalk, for DNA technology continues to advance. Systems are currently becoming available that
permit analysis of mitochondrial DNA, a substance that resists degradation more effectively than the cellular DNA that formed the
basis for the first generation of tests and can be more easily recovered from hair and bone. to Similarly, more sophisticated and sensitive methods of DNA analysis are beginning to be tested that can
engage in DNA matching hom ever smaller amounts of biological
material. Laboratory reports have been released of effective D A
matches from the small amounts of skin cells contained in smudged
10. E.g., Michael P. rVlayko, New Tesls for Older Crimes, C00-!:-i. Pas;-', !\fov. 25,
~OO;).
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latent finger or palm prints. I I Indeed, in New York City, the Medical Examiner's office has recently established a plan to open a highsensitivity DNA laboratory to test such evidence from nonviolent
crime scenes. I :2 These en1erging developments mean that, just as
the semen stains that could not be tested at Mr. Godschalk's initial
trial became determinative evidence ten years later, a variety of formerly mute materials currently in evidence rooms-from murder
weapons to masks to crime scene cigarette butts and fingerprintscould, in the next few years, conclusively inculpate or exonerate
prisoners \<\'ho are currently incarcerated.
In response to these developments, civil liberties advocates are
likely to bring another wave of cases seeking to invoke the power of
the DNA "truth machines." Advocates will, quite legitimately, demand preservation of evidence that might be tested in the future, as
well as access to evidence that is newly probative. I ~ They will claim,
with force, that access to potentially determinative laboratory tests
should not be denied to prisoners who are indigent, lest the criminal justice system come to resemble (even more) the Civil War
draft, in which only the poor were ultimately taken by the state. We
are likely, as well, to see continued pressure on the Supreme
Court's "actual innocence" jurisprudence, I-I as advocates for prisoners exonerated by newly available evidence challenge the right of
the state to rely on the outcome of earlier trials where the evidence
was unavailable. I~)
I 1. Eg., :v1. Kinga Balogh et al., S'TR Gelloty/Jing and mtDNA SeqllPllcing oj Latent
FingerjJrints on PalJer, 137 FORENSIC SCI. h'i"r'L 188 (~OO:~); Charles Choi, DNIl Extradable from FlngerjJrints, U:'>iITED PRESS INTERNATION.\L SCI. NEWS, July 31, 2003,
availablp at http:/h\'w\v.upi.com/view.cfm?Stor)'LD=2()0~~0730-040600-41
0 2r.
12. Shaila K. Dewan, As Police Fxtmd Use of DNA, A Smudge Could Trap a i'hiej,
N.Y. TJi\IFS, lay 26, ~004, at Al (reporting the plan LO open a laboratory that call
tcst "DNA samples previously considered too miniscule to collect, like skin cells left
in a smudged fingerprint or a ski mask" and use of similar techniques in iVIiami).
13. As Justice Stevens has recently observed, many states havc evolved constitutional doctrines in this regard that are more protective than those of the federal
constitution. Illinois v. Fisher, 1~4 S.Ct. 1~OO, 1203 n." (20tH) (per curiam) (Stevens,]., concurring) (listing state courts that have dccided that Joss or destruction
of evidence critical to the defense violates due process evcn without bad hlith).
For discussion of the duty to preserve evidencc, sec Kreimer & Rudovksy, su/)w
note 2, at 585-87.
14. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390
(1993). For discussion of the interaction between exculpatory DNA evidence and
the "actual innocence" jurisprudence, see Kreimer & Rudovsky, .11£/)1"0 note 2, at
598-606.
15. See, e.g., Cooper v. Woodford, 357 F.3cl 1054 (9th Cir. ~004) (granting stay
of execution in pan based on claim to use newly available tests of mitochondrial
DNA evidence).
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More pervasively, the justice system will be faced with the question of what to do with the over ninety percent of crinlinal cases
that are resolved by plea bargains.1() Although plea bargaining
rules require defendants to acknowledge guilt of the crimes to
which they plead,17 the criminal justice system is haunted by the
specter of defendants who, whether by fear, ignorance, or confusion, are induced to plead guilty to crimes they have not in fact
committed. The prospect of newly probative DNA evidence may
move this specter out of the shadows. ltl
In many situations, courts are understandably skeptical of postplea claims of innocence. Such claims are easy to make, and, without the record of a prior trial, difficult to disprove. But newly
probative DNA evidence offers the possibility of defendants who
can demonstrate with scientific certainty that they are factually innocent of a crime to which they pleaded guilty, and in the case of a
sufficient showing that they are "actually innocent," judicial reluctance to revisit plea agreements can sometimes be overcome.l~ Assuming that a sufficient showing of actual innocence can become
the predicate for overturning or withdrawing a plea agreement-or
indeed that it could become the basis for a persuasive plea for clemency-courts will face the issue of whether a plea bargain can waive
a defendant's interest in obtaining access in the future to information that could destroy the factual validity of the underlying guilty
plea.~() NIany state statutes and proposed federal rules similarly authorize defendants to enter "knowing and voluntary" waivers of
their statutory rights to prevent the destruction of evidence.
In its most recent analysis of the scope of rights waived by plea
bargains, the Supreme Court in United Stales v. Ruiz'2! confronted a
defendant's due process claim that a guilty plea entered without
I G. j,,'.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy ,,"VIU'>IF It Matln~: Brady \". i\l<llyland ill
tlte Plea [Jmgailling Context, 80 W,\SH. U.L.Q. 1, I n.2 (2002).
17. j,,'.g., lvlcCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 4:"19, 466 (1969).
18. 5i(l(\ e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, TIt(.> PmblPJII oj" False (;o/lj('ssio/ls
ill thp Post-[),vA lNorM, 82 l .c. L. RE\. 891 (2004) (detailing Ltlsc cunfessions and
false plea bargains disclosed by DNA testing).
19. CJ. BOLlSley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998) (determil~ing that
collateral attack on plea bargain may be premised on showing that one is '"actually
innocent").
20. See Daina Boncck, Note, Pleas for DNA :resting: ""PI.)' Lawlflo!ms Should
A Ilu'>/Id State Postwnviction DNA Testing Statutes to AIJilly to Prisonrn \-\·'710 Pled Guilt)', 25
CWDOZO L. REV. 1429 (2004) (identifying cases in which defendants who had pled
guilty were exonerated by DNA testing and arguing that statutes should be
amended to allow access to evidence by defendants incarcerated as a result of a
plea bargain).
21. 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
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prosecutorial disclosure of "impeaching" material was not valid.
The Supreme Court observed that due process analysis requires the
court to consider" (1) the nature of the private interest at stake, but
also (2) the value of the additional safeguard, and (3) the adverse
impact of the requirement upon the Government's interests."'22
Since the underlying plea agreement in Ruiz committed the government to disclosing any evidence establishing the factual innocence of the defendant, the Court found the waiver of access to
impeachment evidence to be consistent with the demands of due
process. The disclosure of substantively exculpatory evidence was
adeq uate to diminish concerns that, in the absence of further disclosure, "innocent individuals, accused of crimes, will plead
guilty."2?
In contrast, where the government denies postconviction access to the "truth machine" of potentially determinative DNA testing to those who have pleaded guilty, the possibility of miscarriage
of justice is directly at issue. The risk of imprisoning the innocent
should weigh heavily against the government in the due process
balance, and those who are incarcerated pursuant to guilty pleas,
like those who have been found guilty after trial, should be free to
seek access to dcterminatively exculpatory evidence.

II.
CONSEQUENCES: THE DARK SIDE OF ACCURACY
The metaphor of the "truth machine" may take civil libertarians in unaccustomed directions, for the lure of "truth" is not easily
cabined. A number of important structural aspects of our criminal
justice system are designed not to maximize accuracy in adjudica'tion but to minimize government rnisconduct. 21 The window into
the past offered by DNA testing highlights the tradeoIEs between
these protections and the goal of accurately discerning guilt or innocence. I would like to spend a few moments exploring two of
these collateral consequences of deploying the trope of Dr A testing as "truth machine."
22. fd, at 631.
23, fd,
2-:1:. S'N'Tom Stacy, nzt' S'eardl For Tmllt in Constiluliol/a{ Crimina{ Procedure, ~Jl
COl.L;\l. 1.. RE\'. 1309, 1374-H5 (1991) (discussing the distinction between "truth

impairing" rights, such as those "involving search and scizare law, confessions, the
Double Jeopardy Clause, harmless constitutional error, and the scope of federal
habeas corpus," and "truth furthering" rights).
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DNA Databases

First, as its invocation by the Attorney General suggests, the
metaphor of the "truth machine" is two edged: in Attorney General
A~hcroft's terminology, DNA testing functions not only by "clearing
the innocent," but also by "identifying the guilty."~" The increasing
probative power of DNA tests has led to an increased demand by
law enforcement for access to DNA profiles of potential suspects.
The larger the number of suspects with whom a DNA profile can be
compared, the more effective the "truth machine" will be. And the
more effective the truth machine, the more fervent will be the desire for its deployment.
In 1984, DNA identification matching was discovered by geneticist Alec Jefferys in the United Kingdom. Two years later, the police of Narborough, England, used DNA nlatching techniques to
exonerate their prime suspect in the rape and murder of two teenaged girls. But their search for "truth" did not end there. The
Narborough officials sought, and obtained, "voluntary" blood samples from all 4000 adult males in the town and surrounding environs. As it turned out, the results did not identify the rapist, but it
was later discovered that one of the local residents, Colin Pitchfork,
had persuaded a friend to give a blood sample in his stead. Pitchfork \vas arrested, tested, and convicted as the murderer.~6
Over the last decade and a half, British law enforcement has
continued to expand the scope of the DNA data kept available for
potential matching. In 1995, Great Britain began a national collection of DNA profiles from individuals convicted of crimes, as well as
some arrested for major oflenses, a collection that currently contains profiles of two million individuals, or more than one of every
thirty members of the entire British population. n New legislation,
which authorizes the collection and maintenance of profiles from
:25. Attorney General John A.shcroft, News Conference Oil O?\A Initiative,
SII/}/([ note 5 rOt A technology has proven itself to be the truth machine of law
enforcement, ensuring justice by identifying the guilty and exonerating the innoccnt."); jus/lCf' De/)/. Acls to Clear ONA U(lc!dog, MIAMI HER.\LU, Aug. :2, 2001, at 19A
(quoting Attorney General Ashcroft as saying, "DNA technology can operate as a
kind of truth machine, ensuring.justice by identifying the guilt), and clearing the
innocent.") .
~(). Freel \V. Drobner, Comment, DNA Dragnets: ConstiluliollaL AsjJerts of kIass
[)/\s·\ [dmtij/ratioll Testing, 28 c.\P. Li. L. RE\'. 479, 479 (2000) (recounting the Colin
Pi tchfork saga).
27. Alan Travis, Fears as J)NA Database Passes 2m iVI(lIj{, TilE CU.\RIlL-\N
(Manchester), July 15, 2003, at 3; see Aaron P. Stevens, 1 ote, Al'rpstlng Crimp: Ic'x/)(lilding the S'co/Je of DivA Databases in Amen:m, 79 TEX. L. REV. 921,944 (2001) ("The
British database, begun in 1995, contains over 940,000 profiles and is expected to

I
I
\

I

I
I
I
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all individuals who are arrested for crimes, will increase the nun1ber
of samples.~H The British database results annually in 21,000 "hits,"
and is credited with having linked suspects to an average of 15
murders, 31 rapes, and 770 car crimes per month last year.~!J
In the U nired States, all fifty states have authorized the collection of DNA salnples from convicted sex offenders.~o Most also demand and index samples from those convicted of murder,
kidnapping, and robbery; some states have begun to expand the
sample set to include individuals who have been arrested but not
convicted and those convicted of juvenile offenses. 3l A federally
supervised national database of convicted offenders, the "Combined D TA Index System" ("CODIS"), began operation in 1998
(the practice of requiring DNA samples from most federal offenders was established in 2000)3~ and currently contains the profiles of
over 1.4 million individuals.?>3 Attorney General Ashcroft two years
soon encompass one-third of all males in the COlll1tr)' between the ages of sixteen
and thirty.").
2R. Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. cl4, ~ 10 (Eng.).
29. TraYis,IIIIJI(1 note '27.
~(). jefTrey S. Grand, \lote, The l3Iooding afAmerica: Pri7 1ary and [he DNA DmgnPL,
'2:' C\\ZI)OZO 1,. Rl\. 2277, '22RO n.16 ('2002).
31. Lg., National Conference of State Legislatures, State Laws on DNA Data
BanI,s Qualifying Offenscs, Others vVho I\!lust Provide Sample (2003) (giving account of DNA databanking statutes in fifty states), available aL http:! /
www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/DNAoffenses.htm;L.\.RE\·.ST.\T.AN:--J.
~~ 601-09 (vVest Supp. '2(04) (authorizing collectioJl and databanking of DNA
samples of persons arrested for felonies or other specified offenses); TEX. GO\"T
COllI': A:"N. S '~11.1471 (a) (1)-(2) (Vernon 1998 & Supp. 2(04) (authorizing collection of D: A samples from persons indicted or arrested for one of a number of
enumerated felonies); Jonathan Kimmelman, Risking f,'[hical Insolvency: A SUI1H:')' oj'
Trfllds ill Crimillal UNA Databankillg, 28 J.L. MED. & ETlllCS 209, ~lO, 219 (2000)
(listing twcntv-six states that include juvenile offenders); Rochelle 1,. Haller, Note,
T11l~ fnllo(pnu' Pm/pctioll Act: '-\-71)' F'nlnal Aleasllres RPq'lliring Poslcollviclion DNA TesLing
and PrpsPlwlLiof! oj' I~virlell(e are NeedNI in Order Lo Reduce Lhe Risk of vVrongflll EXfCl/.liollS, 18 NYL. SeI-J. J Hu:-.!. RTS. 101, 104 n.15 CWO!) (indicating that twenty-six
statcs collectj m'cn iIe information); Maria Glod, \/a. Lo Begi'n Taking DNA After A rIPS/S FM Fr'lonies: Pr(l.lecll.Lo!:l, Righls AclipisLs SpliL on DaLabase jj'xjJansion, \VASI-!. POST,
Jan. 1, ~()()3, at 131 (detailing Virginia's practices); News Release, California Secretary of State, PlOposccl Initiative Enters Circulation (describing a proposed California initiative that would require DNA samples of all individuals arrestcd for
felon ies), al http://w\\ow.ss.ca.gov/ execlllive/pressjelcases/2004/04_013.pdf
(Feb. Y, ~O(4).
32. U nitccl States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2(03), varaLed ell
ball( by 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 20(4).
3:). Attorney General John Ashcroft, News Conference on President Bush's
D IA Initiati\T, al http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2003/031102c!naremarks.
h LIn (~'!ar. 1!, 20(3).
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ago announced a plan to increase the system's capacity from 1.5
million DNA profiles to 50 nlillion DNA profiles, a goal that exceeds even the British system's aspiration,~4 and has floated proposals to include "suspected terrorists" and people associated with
terrorist groups in the national database.:~;) Currently pending legislation would allow the inclusion of all DNA information collected
under authority of state law, including information from arrestees,
juvenile offenders, and presumably medical records as well if the
states choose to make them available. 36
In the United States, unlike in Great Britain, one might have
expected that the Fourth Amendment would stand in the way of
establishing or expanding DNA databases, or of genetic dragnets.
But it is here that the metaphorical power of the "truth machine"
preys upon the fragility of Fourth Amendment doctrine. A constitutional rule that prohibits "unreasonable" searches and seizures is
unlikely, in the final analysis, to prevent the deployment of "truth
machines." \lVho, after all, can claim it is "unreasonable" to seek
information that will unerringly indict the guilty and free the innocent, particularly if the information obtained can be limited to
'~jllnk DNA" that serves only to truthfully identify perpetrators of
crimes?~7
.
Involuntary collection of DNA blood samples is, to be sure, a
"search" or "seizure" for purposes of the Fourth Anlendment. But
challenges to the involuntary collection of DNA profiles for inclusion in such databases have for the most part been unsuccessfu1.:~1'
3/1. Attorney General John Ashcroft, News Conference on D;\;A Initiative,
note 5.
3:l. Dana Milbank, PIf'Sirll:'lIt Asks jfJl' FXjwndfrl Patriot Act: Alltlwuh' .)'oll/l;ht To
Fight Tn-tOl. Sept. 11, 2003, W.\SII. POST, at A I; Nat Hentoff, Ashnoji Out oj ContlUl,
VIU .. VOICE, Mar. .5-11, 2003, at ~9.
3b. The pending federal Ackmcing Justice through DNA Technolog} Act
\\'(lltld allow inclusion of any "persons whuse DNA samples arc colkcted under
applicable legal authorities," except those '\o]untarilv" collected "for elimination."
S. 1700, 1013th Congo ~ 103(a) (20(r:~). Medical privacy statutes may impose some
limits on \vhich information may be provided without consent, Sfe il/jio note 54,
but states remain free to seek consent from patients.
37 . ."leI:', e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, ,.\ Smnhforfustic{' in Our Gmes, N.Y. TI\IES, f\.lay
7, 200:2, at A::\ 1 (describing support for D0JA testing legislation across the political
spectrum and proposing that, to minimite the intrusion on privacy, legislation be
limited to "so-called junk DNA-parts of the D1 A code that identifY indi\'iduals
without revealing other medical faets").
313. For recent lists of cases upholding DNA extraction for databanks, sec,
e.g.. United States V. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 830-31 (9th Cir. 2004) (pluralityopinion) (en bane), Nicholas V. Coord, No. 01 Civ. 7891, 2003 U.S. DisL LEX!S 1621, at
"'24-26 (S.D.NY. Feb. 6, 20(3), and Stevens, supra note 2/. at 940 rChallenges to
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Such challenges have run aground on one of two theories. Some
courts have relied on the doctrine that searches and seizures can be
reasonable despite the absence of individualized suspicion, probable cause, or a warrant where "special needs" beyond the normal
need for law enforcement exist. 39 As with warrantless and suspicionless blood and urine testing of railroad employees involved in
major train accidents 40 or warrantless urine testing of certain customs employees,41 these courts have held that the acquisition of
samples for DNA databases seeks not punishment but prophylaxis.
Such acquisitions, it is argued, are not searches designed to lay the
foundation for investigating and punishing the individuals from
whom samples are taken, but rather are akin to administrative efforts to prevent future harm. Thus, they accord with the Fourth
AInendment when their intrusion on privacy is "reasonable" in light
of the public good served. Other courts have sustained the collection of samples from those who have been convicted of crimes on
the basis of the diminished expectation of privacy that accompanies
conviction and incarceration. 42
The single recent appellate exception is Judge Reinhardt's
opinion in United States v. Kincade,43 which, before being reversed
by the Ninth Circuit en bane, found a violation of the Fourth
An1endment in the federal requirement that parolees submit to
blood extraction so that their Dl A can be included in the national
CaDIS database. Judge Reinhardt's approach does not, I fear, proconvict-DNA-databasc statutes ha\e been rejected in every jurisdiction where they
have heen brought, save [Massachusetts] .").
;)9. E.g., Killradf', ?!79 f.:kl at 840 (Gould, J, concurring); United States v.
Kimler, 335 F.?!d 1l?!2, 1146 (10th Cir. 2(03); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 7'2, 78-82
(2d Cir. 1999).
40. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' A.5s'n, 489 U.S. 602 (19WJ).
41. Nat'l Treasury E.mployees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. b:'16 (1989).
42. I~.g., Kinaulf', 379 F.3d at 833-%; Velasquez v. vVnods, ?!'29 F.;)d 420 (5th
eir. 20(3) (per curiam); Shaffer v. Same, 148 F.3d 1180, 1181 (10th Cir. 1998)
("[\N]hile obtaining DNA samples implicates Fourth Amendment concerns, it is
reasonable in light of an illlllate's diminished privacy rights, the minimal intrusion
involved, and the legitimate government interest in using DNA to investigate and
prosecute crimes."); Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[Convicted felons] do not ha\'e the same expectations of privacy in their identifying
genetic information that 'free persons' have."); Jones V. Murray. 962 F.2d 302, 307
(4th Cir. 1992) ("With the person's loss of liberty upon arrest comes the loss of al
least some, if not all, rights to personal privacy otherwise protected by the Fourth
Amendment.") .
4;), United States Y. Kincacle, 345 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 20(3), ,)([((IINI f''i/ ballc 1J~
379 F.3d HJ3 (9th Cir. 20(4).
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vide much hope of constraining the expansion of the databases, for
three reasons.
First, the trend of Supreme Court precedent is not auspicious.
Judge Reinhardt's Kincade opinion found that the absence of any
requirement of individualized suspicion rendered the sampling requirement unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It rejected the government's claim that the effort to establish a
comprehensive national database was a "special need," accurately
observing that two recent Supreme Court decisions place constraints on the application of the "special needs" doctrine. City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond 44 held that although previous cases had determined that highway checkpoints established to test drivers for
inebriation could invoke the "special need" to preserve public
safety as a basis for suspicionless searches, highway checkpoin ts established to search cars for illegal drugs required probable cause. A
"general interest in crime control" was not a special need justifying
warrantless stops. Similarly, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,4:; a public hospital tested pregnant women for drug use and then made
available to the police the results of those tests if a woman tested
positive twice. The Court acknowledged that one goal of the program was the preservation of the health of the women and their
prospective children, but since "the immediate oqjective of the
searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement jnajJoses," the
health goal did not establish a "special need" obviating the requirement of individualized suspicion. 4fi
Taken together, Ferguson and Edmond lend support to the proposition that the "law enforcement purpose" of DNA databanks requires that sampling be conducted only on the basis of
individualized suspicion. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's most
recent analysis, Illinois v. Lidster,47 once again abandons the requirement of individualized suspicion and compares" 'the gravity of the
public concerns served by seizure, the degree to which the seizure
advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference
with individual liberty'" in evaluating highway checkpoints seeking
44. 331 U.S. 32 (2000).
43. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
46. Jd. at 83-84.
47. 124 S.Ct. 885 (2004). The majority in Lidster determined that "unlike f~'d
IIwnd, the context here (seeking information from the public) is one in which, hv
definition, the concept of individualized suspicion has little role to play. Like certain other forms of police activity, say, crowd control or puhlic sdkty, an inforrnation-seeking stop is not the kind of event that involves sllspicion, or lack of
suspicion, of the relevant individual." fd. at 889.
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information from motorists. 4H This bodes ill for the opponents of
sampling; those who seek to deploy the "truth machine" can rely on
the gravest of public concerns, and where the state invokes a desire
to deter future crimes or exonerate future innocents, only a little
doctrinal manipulation is necessary to distinguish the effort to apprehend current or past violators in Edmond and Ferguson. Indeed,
Kincade has been rejected by two other circuits,·l,:) and the Ninth
Circuit reversed the decision on en banc review. 00
Second, Judge Reinhardt's opinion in Kincade relies on the
physical intrusiveness of the blood sample required of probationers, which "necessitate [s] penetrating the skin," to distinguish the
blood sample from the fingerprinting of parolees that it acknowledges as constitutiona1.:")j Even if Judge Reinhardt's theory finds
favor in another court, it is far from clear that the more modern
technique of buccal swab collection would be unconstitutionaL
The reasoning seems entirely inapplicable to such emerging collection mechanisms as fingerprints or hair samples. It would, therefore, hardly impede the collection of D TA profiles in the emerging
technological environment. 02
48. fd. at 890 (quoting Brmvn v. Texas, 44~ U.S. 47, 51 (L Y79».
49. Groccman v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 354 F.~d 411, 413 (;:)th Cir. 20(4);
U]I iteel States v. Plotts, 347 F.3d R73, 877 (J Oth Cir. 2(03); see also Green \·.Berge,
3::>·1· F.3cl 675,081 (7th Cir. 20(4) (Edstcrbrook,J., concuning) (rejecting Kincade
~lS to probationers but suggesting that testing of the populatioll as a \v'ho!e would
c1iffer) .
SO. Kinuule, 379 F.3d 81'3. In reversing by a vote of 6-5, the en banc panel
manifested the unsettled nature of the area. The six-member majority cOldd not
coalesce around a single theory of decision, and both Judge O'Scannlain's fivemember plurality and Judge Gould's concurrence emphasized that the decision
resolved only the issue of testing and databanking the DNA of individuals who
were on parole or supervised release. The decision was taken over separate spirited dissents filed by Judges Reinhardt, Kozinski, and Hawkins.
51. 34.5 F.3d at 1100.
52. Judge Kozinksi's clis;;;ent in Kincade recognizes that
\\'e can't go anywhere or do much of anything without \caving a bread-crumb
trail of identifying DNA matter. If we have no legitimate expectation of pri\'acv in such bodily material, what possible impediment can there be to having
the government collect what we leave behind, extract its DNA signature and
cnh,lnce CaDIS to include everyone?
Kill ((ule, 379 F.3d at 873 (Kozinski,j., dissenting). His analysis would find that "the
Fourth :\mendmen.t intrusion here is not primarily the taking of the blood, but
seizLire of the DNA fingerprint and its inclusion in a searchable database." lrl.
Juclge KOZInski acknowledges, however, that this approach is at odds with settled
analyses of the use of fingerprint,>. fd. A serious dfon to implunelll it would
require the courts to recast a broad swath of constitutional doctrine reducmg or
limiting the ability of governmellt to search its own files and files held by others.
F.g., ~;rnilh v. :vlaryland,:JA2 U.S. 73;'), 744-4G (1979) (concluding that "pen regis-
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Third, and most importantly, expansions of DNA databases are
likely to continue with the addition of samples whose provenance
cannot be subjected to Fourth Amendment challenge. Samples legitimately collected in the course of initial criminal investigations
or arrests where probable cause is present for other crimes cannot
be quarantined once they are in the hands of law enforcement
agencies. Samples collected by government for other purposes may
also be su~ject to subsequent inclusion in national databases. Thus,
the U.S. military currently holds DNA profiles of over three million
current and former servicemen,:'>~ and medical records increasingly
will make reference to DNA structures. As long as there is "consent" to the initial collection of information, there are limits to the
Fourth Amendment objections that can be raised to further dissemination of those records. 04
ter" does not require warrant, since telephone numbers arc disclosed to telephone
company); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1977) (holding that neither the
immediate nor the threatened impact of the patient-identification requi1'ements
and databan ks on eithcr the reputation or thc independence of patients for whom
certain drugs are medically indicated is sufficient to constitute an invasion of any
right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendmcnt); United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435,442-43 (1976) (holding that depositor has no legitimate expectation
of privacy in bank records); California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21,54
(1974) (finding that required maintenance of bank records does !lot violate
Fourth Amendment). I \vould applaUd such a developmcnt. but r am skeptical as
to its likelihood under the current Court.
53. Patricia A. Ham. An Arlll)' uf Sus/Jerts: TIie lfistory ([lid Constitution([lity of tltl>
us. Military:~ /)/\'";\ Re/Jository rtlld Its Access/or !Ja" blforrnne"llt Pm/msps, AR\-IY LA\\·.,
July-Aug. 2003, at 1, ].
54. Statutory proteClions of medical privacy may provide some hedge against
this development. e.g., Dep't of Health and Human Sen's., Questions ([lid Answers,
ALa) rmwrpd nUities disclose jJmtpc/ed health information to law enJimnnent ollicials?, ([t
htrp:! /allSwers.hhs.g-ov/ cgi-bin/hhs.cfg/php/ enduser/ std_alp.php (last modified
.July 26. 2(04) (setting forth limits on dissemination of health information. but
indicating- that information can be freely disseminated for national security purposes, to "respond to an administrative request," or "[t]o a la\~' enforcement officially [sic] reasonably able to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to
the health or safety of an individual or the public"). But in the absence of a constitutional underpinning, one suspects that such protections will deform quicklv
uncler the impact of the demands for the "truth machine."
Similarly, DNA dragnels as executed throughout the country ha\"t~ relied on
"consent" to validate suspicion less DNA sampling. Thc police present recalcitrant
citizens with the Hobson '5 choice of "voluntarily" submitting to DNA sampling or
becoming targcts for focused investigation or (according to allegations) public
identification. See Richard Willing, Pn:v([r)' !SSIlP is tlip Catch for Policf' DNA Dmgnets,
USA TODAY, Sept. 16, 1998, at lA (recounting the use of dragnets in Prince
George's Countv, MD: San Diego; Miami; and Ann Arbor, MJ); Jack Leonard, Using DNA to Tmwlfrn KillPl:~, LA. T''\IES, Mar. 10,2001, at Al (describing "genetic
dragnets" across the countl-y, including a search in Costa Ivlesa, CA. in which 188
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The conventional libertarian response to this state of affairs is
to bemoan the flaccid quality of Fourth Amendment doctrine and
to call for a renewal of commitment to privacy in the face of technological encroachment. I confess I have some attraction to this convention, but, having argued for the social importance of DNA
testing as a truth machine, the conventional response comes at a
price: each excluded DNA profile not only reduces the probability
that a guilty person will be convicted of a crime (or a potential offender deterred), but reduces as well the probability that an innocent person will go free. Mter all, one of the emerging uses of DNA
testing (as in the Central Park jogger case) is to establish a suspect's
innocence by showing that the crime in question was committed by
another."C)
Equally important, those already involved with the criminal justice system will inevitably be part of the national database. Given
this, there is a civil libertarian argument for expanding the database
still further. If databases are limited to those who have been convicted of crimes, given the current biases of our criminal justice systenl, this will be a pool of potential suspects for future criminal
investigation (in crimes ranging from murder to car theft) that is
disproportionately comprised of members of minority communities, This result, in turn, means 1=\\'0 things, First, it means that the
bias of future investigations vvill be exacerbated. It is always easier
to focus on a pool of suspects as to whom data is plentiful; if that
pool is current suspects and previous offenders, future convictions
will come even more extensively from that pool. Second, it means
that political pressure to control the collateral use of criminal justice databases will narrow, l\tIisuse of a database that includes only
the dispossessed will be of relatively little concern to the complacent majority, As a second-best solution, the force of the "truth machine" may drive civil libertarians to support universal D A
clataban ks.

"yo]ulltan'" mouth swab samples were taken from persons who frequented the
same environs as murder victim Sunny Suc!\veeks; a search in Miami, where police
tested ~noo men "along a trail where the bodies of six prostitutes had heen
dumped;" and searches in Lawrence, MA. and the Bronx); Keith O'Brien, lVff'll. Snd{
Reflllll of DNA. from Serial Killer S'earrh, TI\WS-P,c:.WUNF., Dec. 28, 2003, at A-I (Baton
Rouge police obtained 1200 mouth swab samples in search for serial killer).
!'is. Jim Dwyer. Verrlirf fhal FailE'ri the ]pst a/TimE', NY TIIVIES, Dec. 6, 2002, at Al
(recounting exoneration or teenagers convicted or raping ajogger in Central Park
af'ter the conression of' another prisoner was supported by DNA evidence).
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Double Jeopardy

Finally, let me turn to a second ominous consequence of the
deployment of the "DNA as truth machine" trope. In Godschalk, as
in many cases of D TA exoneration, one of the objections raised to
our efforts on :Mr. Goclschalk's behalf was that "finality" is a value in
the criminal justice system-that having proved the case against Mr.
Godschalk beyond a reasonable doubt, neither prosecutors nor victims should be vexed by the necessity of revisiting a painful set of
circumstances. Our response, quite legitimate in my view, was to
deny that "finality" should override the claims of "factual justice" as
established by DNA.
In the last two years there has been a disquieting inversion of
this argument in both the United Kingdom and Australia. In both
countries proposals have been put forward that individuals who
have been acquitted of crimes should be subjected to subsequent
prosecution when the state adduces new and determinative evidence of guilt.!"(} Doctrines of double jeopardy, so the argument
goes, were formed in an era before the availability of the "truth
machine" of DNA. Just as verdicts of guilty should not be allowed
to stand in the face of a showing of factual innocence, erroneous
verdicts of innocent should give way before a scientific showing of
"factual guil t. "
Lest you believe that these arguments are phantoms conjured
up by an excessively imaginative law professor, I direct your attention to the British Criminal Justice Act of 2003, which, in addition
to authorizing involuntary DNA sampling of all arrestees, also provides that the Court of Appeals may order the retri.al of a person
convicted of murder, rape, kidnappi.ng, drug offenses, or terrorism
where there is "new and compelling evidence against the acquitted
person. "~7
The British, lacking a "Hitten constitution, arc free to eliminate
double jeopardy protections by legislation. An effort to transfer
such an approach to the United States would face constitutional
barriers, for the United States, unlike the Great Britain, entrenches
our prohibitions against double jeopardy in both federal and state
56. Paul Roberts, Double jro/lald} Lalli RPfonn: A Criminaljllsfire Commen/wy, 65
1.. RE\·. 393 (2002) (discllssing and critiquing development of British proposal): Michael Kirby, Carroll, fJoub/eJeojJauly and In/erna/ional Human Rights [,ilW, '2.7
CRIM. 1.. J. 231, 238-45 (2003) (discllssing and critiquing Australian campaign to
lift clouhlejeopardy bar). A similar proposal was recently rejected in New Zealand.
NEW ZEAL\ND L·\w CO'\!l\!fSSI00i, A( :Ql 'I1T\L FOLLOWINC PER\T.RSION OF 1'1 iE COURSE
OF .JUSTICE (Law Commission Report No. 70, 2001).
~ 7 ..rJmJl1<l
("
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constitutions. The classic statement, repeated regularly by the
Court, is Justice Black's formulation that the double jeopardy protection guards against prosecutorial abuse:
[T] he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for
an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. 58
Yet contemporary double jeopardy doctrine seems flexible
enough to allow a variety of gambits for the state or federal government to deploy newly obtained evidence, particularly if statutes of
limitations are tolled by the emergence of new DNA testing mechanisms. 59 Double jeopardy, the Court has held, bars only re-prosecution by the same sovereign. Thus, where the same conduct violates
both state and federal law (as, for example, in the case of drug possession), "dual sovereignty" theory will allow a second prosecution
in federal court for state crimes or vice versa. flO Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that double jeopardy does not bar the state
from introducing evidence of criminal acts of which a defendant

:')8. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732 (1998) (citing Green in support of the proposition that
the "need for reliability accords with one of the central concerns animating the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy").
59. For a recent list of pending proposals to toll or eliminate statutes of limitations, see Smith Alling Lane, 2003 Statute of Limitations Legislation, at http://
www·.dnaresoLH.cc.com/2003%20Statute%200f%20Limitations%20Legislation.pdf
(last visited November 2, 2004). For new legislation, see National Conference of
State Legislatures, State Legislation on Statute Of Limitations for Certain Sex Offcnses and fdentifYing Perpetrators by DNA Profiles, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genctics/dnasexoffcn.htm (last visited :'Jov. 2,2(04). The pending
federal Advancing' Justice through DNA Technology Act would allow statutes of
limitations to run from thc time when DNA evidence "implicates a person," rather
than the time of the offense's commission. S. 1700, 108th Congo § 104.
Even without statutory changes, indictments of "DN/\. profiles" may effectively
toll the statute of limitations. Spe e.g., Meredith A. Bieber, Comment, i'vIeeting the
Statute or Beating It: Using 'John Doe" Indirill/ellts Based on DNA to Aleet the Statute of
l~imita!ions, 150 U. p,\, 1" REV. 1079 (2002).
60. Bartkus V. !1linois, 359 U.S. 121, 122-24 (1959) (state prosecution following federal prosecution was not double jeopardy); Abbate v. United States, 359
U.S. 187, 195-96 (1959) (federal prosecution following state prosecution did not
violate double jeopardy protections); Heath V. Alabama, 474 U ,So 82, 88 (1985)
(successive prosecutions in different states did not violate double jeopardy
protections) .
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has been acquitted at sentencing for other subsequent crimes;61 a
fortiori newly available DNA evidence could be admissible to augment sentences for other crimes. So, too, in cases where a defendant has pleaded guilty to a lesser offense, the state may take the
position that subsequent prosecution on a cognate charge is not
barred because 'Jeopardy" has never attached. fi2 A generous construction of the protections against double jeopardy could stymie
these approaches, but the hydraulic pressure exerted by the "truth
machine," if unopposed, is likely to incline courts away from extending protection, and indeed could induce courts to carve new
exceptions to the double jeopardy guaranty.
To the extent that the double jeopardy guaranty is an effort to
avoid "the possibility that even though innocent, a defendant may
be found guilty," the "truth machine" of DNA counts against protection of the accused rather than for it. As the British argument
goes, the second trial will be one where the "guilty" will be found
"guilty." To be sure, opponents of DNA-based retrials can distinguish their own attacks on "finality" on the ground that freeing the
innocent convict is a more pressing social obligation than convicting the guilty acquitee. To fully meet the claims of the "truth machine," however, requires more than this distinction. I suspect that
civil libertarians will find ourselves deploying three sorts of arguments, all of which rely on values in tension with the vision of the
criminal justice system as exclusively concerned with truth.
The first argunlent would recognize that an effort to explore
the "truth" of an acquittal risks undercutting the function of the
61. enited States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam) (holding that
double jeopardy prohibition does not bar sentence enhancement based on acts
related to crimes of which defendant was acquitted); Dowling v. United States, 493
U.S. 34~, :H9 (1990) C[A]n acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the
Government from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action
governed bv a lower standard of proof.").
The impact of the extension of Sixth Amendment protections to certain sentence enhancements in FJfahfly v. WoshiligtOIl, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), on this line of
cases has vet to be determined. C(Jllllm!p, f.g., FJfahdy at 2561-b~ (Breyer.j., dissenting) (raising as an open question whether "the numerous cases of this Court hulding that a sentencing judge may consider virtually any reliable informatioll
[remain] good law"), wilh. e.g., United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464 (5th Cir.
2()04) (holding that mOhf!) did not apply to bar sentence enhancement under federal guidelines on the basis of a ,judicial determination unauthurized by the jUl-Y
verdict) .
62. See gellemlZy Daniel c:. Richman, Brngaining About Futurejeof}(frdy, 49 V,\NU.
L. R.·\. 1181 (1996) (describing the systemic effects of "minimalist" double jeoparch doctrine that may not protect defendants who pleacl guilty against future
prosecution for closely related crimes).
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jury as the conscience of the community. Since it can never be
clear whether an acquittal rested on a failure of proof of "factual
guilt," a failure of persuasion of "legal guilt," or ,jury nullification,
new evidence can never be shown to be determinatively
inculpatory.6~

Second-at least in the case of prior acquittals-we can argue
that failure to accord finality to not-guilty verdicts effectively eviscerates an important check on prosecutorial malice or politically
charged prosecutions. A prosecutor who cannot deploy newly discovered evidence is less likely to spend time obsessively searching
for it; by contrast, an aspiring Inspector Javert unconstrained by
double jeopardy could use the search for new evidence as an occasion to persecute a target indefinitely. We should remember that in
the aftermath of the Kennedy assassination, New Orleans District
Attorney James Garrison's conspiracy theory led him to efforts to
re-prosecute Clay Shaw after acquittal, supported by an organization that went by the name "Truth or Consequences."(j.[
Third, as the penetrating power of state surveillance and scientific testing that can reconstruct the past continues to increase, the
necessity of respect for the "constructed" truth of trial justice becomes more and more ilnportant as a constraint on government
power. The promise of the "truth machine" is also its danger. If
the government is entitled to "do-overs" in the criminal justice system, prosecutorial discretion will effectively come to supplant the
trial as the method of apportioning criminal punishment. In a
world where scientific advances continually allow the government
to discover more about the past, the situation of citizens will increasingly come to resemble that of drivers l~lCing traffic police.
Just as a sufficiently diligent policeman can almost always discover a
traffic violation for which to stop any given driver, an increasingly
omniscient state, if unconstrained by statutes of limitations or
double jeopardy, will ultimately find itself in a position La prosecute
almost anvone who blls short of sainthood. The underlying' dangel', as Justice Jackson observed in a related context, is thaL the administration of the criminal J'LLstice system
"will ha\'c enollQ.'h
on
)
<".J
I

/

<J

63. Commentators he1\T IOllg argued thaL Lhe sLrongest defense of douhle
jeopardv doctrine lies in its protections of jUlY nullification. Sf!"', f.g. Peter Westen
&~ Richard Druhel, Toward (l Geneml FliNJI)' vf Double JPO/HlId)" ] 978 St:l'. Cr. RI·:\". 81.
~ ~s)-·3::2.

64. Robertson \'.

Wegll1,~l1n, ,~:\()

U.S. :")84, !")86 (1978).

~'YU
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enough people, even if it does not elect to prosecute them, so that
it will find no opposition to its policies."6'j
CONCLUSION
The approach of some courts and prosecutors to the question
of innocence in the criminal justice system reads as if they subscribe
to postmodern concepts of socially constructed reality: once the
criminal justice process has run its course, a convicted defendant
becomes "guilty" in the eyes of the law, and that guilt is impervious
to subsequent factual disproof. By contrast, the presuppositions of
civil libertarians like me are resolutely pre-postmodern; we write
under the assumption that the identity of the perpetrator of a crime
is a "real" fact, and that continuing to punish an individual on the
ground that he is the perpetrator when that proposition is scientifically false is "really" unjust. We claim that DNA exonerations are a
more reliable guide to truth than a jury verdict or a guilty plea. We
invoke the power of the "truth nlachine." These claims will continue to echo in the next decade as DNA testing advances.
Yet the allure of accuracy has its costs. It exists in tension with
aspects of the criminal justice system that seek to protect against
invasions of privacy and governmental oppression. The arguments
for "real" guilt and innocence can be deployed to incarcerate as
well as to free and the challenge for civil libertarians in the twentyfirst century will be to acknowledge those tensions, while building
the arguments that will stand as bulwarks against abuse.

65.

H. j,-\C\0;ON,
71 (1955).
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